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Summary 
It is difficult to establish the right relationship between military and civilian elements 
when reforming the police forces in conflict and post-conflict regions. Principles of 
civilian and democratic Security Sector Reform (SSR) emphasize the need to separate the 
military and the police. Nevertheless, everyday reality in many places does not allow the 
realization of this ideal type. The police must adopt a robust stance in order to close 
security gaps and proceed against well organized armed criminals or insurgents. In the 
context of police-building and police reform in fragile states, this means that the police 
must be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary – with regard to their 
equipment, approach, structure and duties. The rapid militarization of the police can 
cause problems. It can lead to a rift between the police and the public which prevents the 
development of a relationship of trust that is so important for police work.  
External actors in Afghanistan are in the process of transferring the responsibility for 
security to Afghan institutions. By the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces are to 
combat insurgency and protect the state and its citizens. Donors are therefore investing 
huge sums, not only in training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA), but 
also in building the Afghan National Police (ANP).  
This report studies the transition from civilian to military-dominated police-building 
in Afghanistan. From 2002, Germany was the lead nation responsible for coordinating 
international assistance for police-building. The German police programme in 
Afghanistan was designed as a sustainable project with a civilian approach. However, 
Germany only invested relatively little funds in the building and reform of the ANP. This 
reflected the initially rather limited involvement of the international community as a 
whole in Afghanistan. The United States’ Afghanistan policy relied on cooperation with 
the warlords as well as on the military regime in Pakistan. This policy served to 
strengthen the armed opposition forces. Once it became clear that the building of the 
ANP was not progressing quickly enough, the USA de facto assumed the lead role in 
police-building in Afghanistan. This meant a change of paradigm from a civilian-based 
police reform to a military-based police reform. Militarization was accelerated by the US-
dominated change of strategy in favour of counterinsurgency in 2009.  
The report refers to the problems of the dominance of military elements in building 
the ANP. It is not clear whether the militarization of the ANP has significantly improved 
the chances of survival for members of the Afghan police. What is certain is that 
militarization cannot solve the problem of the weak legitimacy of the Afghan state. There 
is still a lack of trust between the public and the police, especially as the ANP is 
inadequately equipped to prevent or solve crimes. Moreover, the possible long-term 
consequences of militarization are problematic: It is easier to militarize the police now 
than it will be to drive out the spirit of militarization at a later date. The militarization of 
the ANP is therefore at the best ineffective and at the worst counterproductive. Only a 
police force which the people trust can be effective.  
Apart from describing the shift away from a civilian police model and studying the 
reasons for this transition, the report also has a normative aim: It emphasizes the need for 
advancing civilian police-building. The preconditions for this in Afghanistan are 
everything but ideal. The argument that police reform – and SSR in general – must take 
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second place to strengthening the ANP is wrong, however. After all, it was precisely the 
neglect of police reform that contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in 
the first place. Police reform can only be sustainable if it is linked to reforms in police 
administrative structures and supervisory authorities. The rapid, militarized build-up of 
the police can only create stability in the short term, if at all. The regular police force – the 
Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police (AUCP) – should concentrate on preventing and 
solving crime. Admittedly, in Afghanistan this calls for certain military elements in 
training and equipment so that the police are able to protect themselves from attacks. 
However, only an understanding of civilian police work can establish an atmosphere of 
trust between the public and the police.  
Various steps are necessary to realign police reform in Afghanistan. Civilian police 
experts, not soldiers, should dominate the strategic approach to police reform. 
Furthermore, measures must be taken to tackle the shortage of civilian instructors, 
partners and mentors as quickly as possible. It is also important to support the ANP in 
the long term. The two to three-year project cycles that are normal for international 
cooperation are usually not sufficient for sustainable police reform, among other things 
because they do not give local stakeholders sufficient planning security. Many further 
steps are necessary to improve police work in Afghanistan. These include the reform of 
the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the clear demarcation of areas of responsibility vis-à-vis 
other security players, and closer intermeshing with the justice sector. Furthermore, the 
difficult balancing act between (military) self-defence and the openness of the police 
towards the public requires regional adjustments. These must be accompanied by training 
contents and police work that are in touch with the people, as well as by literacy 
campaigns.  
This report does not call for a new police strategy but for a gradual realignment of the 
reform of the Afghan police that will serve the needs of the Afghan people better than 
efforts to militarize the police.  
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1.  Introduction 
Afghanistan is to take over full responsibility for its own security from the end of 2014. 
International donors stress that the right conditions must be established before the 
withdrawal of international combat forces. One central precondition is that the Afghan 
security forces should have sufficient capacity. International donors are therefore 
investing huge sums in the build-up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan 
National Police (ANP). 
The ANP continues to be in a sorry state. There are countless reports of corruption, 
crime and violations of human rights. Further problems include illiteracy, desertion, drug 
addiction, the misappropriation of wages by superior officers, sales of own equipment to 
criminals and insurgents, mismanagement within the Ministry of Interior Affairs in 
Kabul, and the small number of women within the ANP (e.g. Perito 2009 and ICG 2007). 
Against this background, international support for the ANP is both crucial and difficult.  
This report investigates the problems faced by international players in establishing the 
right relationship between military and civilian elements in building up the ANP. The 
normative principles of Security Sector Reform (SSR) emphasize the need for the 
separation of the military and police. However, it is difficult to achieve this ideal type, 
particularly in high-risk environments where military elements may be needed to close 
security gaps. Civilian elements are just as important, however, to gain the confidence of 
the public and to reduce the risk of the disproportionate use of force. The rapid 
militarization of the police risks creating a rift between the police and the public that 
makes it impossible to achieve the relationship of trust that is so important for police 
work. The police must therefore be as civilian as possible and should only be as military as 
is necessary.  
This report has three objectives. First of all, it sets out to describe the transition from 
civilian to military-dominated police-building. The German police programme, which 
began in Afghanistan in 2002, was designed as a long-term project with a civilian 
approach. However, the Federal Government and the Länder only invested little funding 
in building the ANP and Germany’s political influence was also limited. This low-level of 
involvement reflected a general reticence on the part of international donors to support 
Afghanistan. This reserve together with other factors assisted the insurgents. Once the 
consequences of having an ANP that either had no real presence or was involved in 
criminal activities became clear, the USA de facto took over the lead role in police-
building. This represented a paradigm change from a tentative but civilian-oriented 
police reform to a military police-building exercise. The pace of this transition has 
increased since the announcement of the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) by the USA 
in 2009.  
The report’s second objective is to identify the problems caused by the dominance of 
military elements in building the ANP. There are few clear indications that the 
militarization of the ANP will significantly improve the chances of survival of its 
members. On the other hand, militarization makes it difficult for the police to heal the rift 
with the public. Furthermore, it is easier to militarize the police now than it will be to 
drive out the spirit of militarization in the future. The militarization of the ANP is 
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therefore at the best ineffective and at the worst counterproductive. Only a police force 
which people trust can be effective (Bayley 2005). Finally, the police need the support of 
the people. In Afghanistan, however, it is not sufficiently realized that effectiveness and 
legitimacy go hand-in-hand.  
Thirdly, this report also has a political content: It stresses the need to promote civilian 
police-building. The conditions for this in Afghanistan are anything but ideal. The 
argument that police reform must take second place to strengthening the ANP is wrong, 
however. After all, it was precisely the neglect of police reform that contributed to the 
deterioration of the security situation in the first place. Technical capacity building can 
only be sustainable if it is linked to long-term reforms of police administrative structures 
and supervisory authorities. The rapid build-up of the police can, if at all, only create 
stability in the short term. International stakeholders should support the main pillar of 
the ANP, the regular police force – the Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police (AUCP) – in a 
way that the AUCP can gain public confidence.  
A lot has already been written about police-building in Afghanistan. Most authors take 
a look at the desolate state of the ANP. Some have also written about international police 
work in Afghanistan, whereby the emphasis is on the USA. This report, in contrast, deals 
in detail with the involvement of the German police in Afghanistan.  
This analysis is also relevant from the point of view of policy advice. Donor states want 
to withdraw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible. By supplying police forces and 
militias with arms to provide cover for this retreat, donors risk failing to achieve even 
their minimum goals – such as the avoidance of a full-blown civil war in a heavily armed 
Afghanistan and the presence of international terrorist groups in the country. More 
ambitious objectives such as protecting Afghans from their own state and from non-state 
groups cannot possibly be achieved without incisive reforms and a civilian-oriented 
police force. This report contributes towards raising awareness of the problems of a lack 
of balance between military and civilian elements in international police assistance.1  
There are some things which this report cannot do, however. It does not provide a 
comprehensive account of international involvement in police-building in Afghanistan. 
Many donor states have supported the ANP; but this report concentrates on Germany 
and the USA. Nor does the report attempt to explain the change of paradigm towards 
military-dominated police-building. It describes the conditions which determine the 
balance between military and civilian elements of foreign police assistance: namely, the 
practices of the main donor states and the local conditions for reform in Afghanistan. 
These conditions would have to be broken down into detail to obtain a precise 
explanation.2 The problem of the poor availability of data also prevents a comprehensive 
explanation for the change of paradigm. This is due to lack of data collection activities, 
 
 
1  It also opposes the tendency of external players to place responsibility for the lack of progress on the 
Afghans alone. 
2  The police-building activities of the donor states are determined by national strategic cultures and 
material capacities which cannot be discussed here in detail. 
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particularly at the beginning of the intervention, to security regulations and to the 
problems of access to some parts of the country.  
The report is based on secondary literature and official documents as well as on 
background talks with representatives of German institutions. The talks took place at 
various venues in Germany in 2010 and in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif in October 2010. 
The text also refers to talks with representatives of international and Afghan institutions, 
which were conducted in Kabul and East and South Afghanistan in 2009. The sources of 
much of this information are quoted anonymously as the persons concerned were not 
officially authorized to provide information, were expressing their personal opinions, or 
could suffer harm if their names were published.3  
The second section explains the significance of SSR and police reform in post-conflict 
states. The third section describes the international police activities in Afghanistan in the 
first years following the collapse of the Taliban. The fourth section describes the 
transition towards military police-building efforts from 2005 onwards. The fifth section 
shows how the USA made the ANP an important element of its counterinsurgency 
programme in 2009 and 2010. Section six contains conclusions and recommendations for 
police reform in Afghanistan. 
2.  Security Sector Reform and police reform 
2.1  Security Sector Reform 
SSR sets out to establish a security sector which provides security in a way that is effective, 
efficient, constitutional and democratically legitimized. The concept of SSR originated in 
the 1990s and was the result of various developments (Hänggi 2009). For example, the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact provided opportunities for the democratization of former 
communist states. A further stimulus for SSR was the development of the concept of 
human security, which attached at least as much importance to the security of individuals 
as to that of states. Another important factor was the debate on the mutual conditionality 
of development and security, which emphasized that development is not possible without 
a minimum of security.  
A further factor is the increase in intra-state wars since the end of the East-West 
conflict. These wars are characterized by asymmetric warfare, the problem of 
distinguishing between combatants and civilians, by ethnic and religious cleavages, 
criminalization and the collapse of state institutions. Following the termination of these 
intra-state wars it is therefore important to strengthen or rebuild the state and its 
institutions. The most important fields of SSR are the reform of the military, police, 
 
 
3  Direct quotes from people who are cited anonymously are used as little as possible in order to keep the 
number of statements which cannot be verified by the reader as small as possible. However, the authors 
do use such quotes in certain cases as they give an impression of the atmosphere in Afghanistan and are 
important in view of the lack of data available.  
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justice authorities and intelligence services. Further activities on whose progress SSR 
depends are the control of small arms and light weapons, mine-clearing operations and 
initiatives to establish transitional justice.  
The pertinent SSR literature and international organizations advocate principles such 
as transparency, professionalism, efficiency, appropriateness (of means and resources), 
democratic legitimacy and local ownership. However, the implementation of these 
principles in post-conflict states often varies considerably (Scheye 2010). Apart from 
practical problems, this is frequently due to a lack of conceptual clarity. For example, it is 
often difficult to identify which of the many security stakeholders deserve priority. 
Mistaken sequencing harbours the risk that marginalized groups will feel that they have 
been treated unjustly. Furthermore, there is the danger of regarding SSR as a purely 
technical task and thereby neglecting the political content of the reforms. In addition, 
SSR is based on a Western concept of the state and security. It can hardly be applied 
in a non-Western environment without encountering problems.  
SSR stakeholders such as donor states or the United Nations must therefore 
improvise. All important stakeholders must be involved in SSR processes. SSR 
stakeholders have recognized the danger of underestimating the political content of SSR 
(OECD 2007: 28), where ignorance of local contexts often prevents them from adopting a 
sensitive approach. The problem of the incompatibility of SSR principles with local 
conditions can only be solved through local ownership: Local, non-international 
stakeholders must be the significant driving force behind security sector reform.  
2.2  Police reform and militarization 
The quality of police work has a significant influence on the legitimacy of a state. The 
police are in daily contact with the public and are therefore more visible than soldiers, for 
example. Only public trust in the police provides the preconditions for the latter to 
establish human security effectively. However, the police are frequently unable to protect 
citizens against crime and violence, particularly after war when the police often are even 
the source of insecurity. The general principles applying for SSR should also guide police 
reform. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), which played a leading role in devising the concept of SSR, the police are a 
service provider for the public (OECD 2007: 172). They are subject to the law and 
accountable to the public. Their tasks must therefore be clearly identifiable and verifiable. 
The police should prevent crime by working closely with the public (an approach 
commonly labelled as community policing).  
The principle of a civilian police force implies the separation of police and military duties. 
Police who are trained and equipped to work close to the public and to use a minimum of 
force have better opportunities for building confidence and for obtaining information. The 
military, on the other hand, is the institution which uses the maximum degree of force. It 
usually has little everyday contact with the civilian population due to being stationed in 
barracks. The disproportionate and excessive use of force can in turn provoke violent 
counter-reactions and thus precipitate a spiral of escalation. Furthermore, the police, 
unlike the military, can secure and present evidence that can be used in court.  
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The separation of police and military duties is particularly important in countries 
which have experienced an intra-state conflict. The police forces in such states are often 
militarized, biased and responsible for violations of human rights. The demilitarization 
and democratic control of the police are therefore essential factors for ensuring that the 
latter are accepted by the majority of the population. A civilian approach and a clear 
separation of duties are preconditions for winning trust.  
However, the separation of police and military duties is difficult in these countries due to 
gaps in security. On the national side, these gaps occur because police forces in post-
conflict states do not provide effective and unbiased security, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
for example. In other cases, there are no longer any official security forces – Kosovo is a 
good example of this type of situation. Furthermore, international players very often do 
not send members of their own civilian police forces until months after the end of a war 
and then in insufficient numbers. In addition, international police forces do not always 
have the capabilities necessary to take effective action against presumed war criminals, 
criminal groups, illegal intelligence services, paramilitary intra-state (in)security forces or 
even violent demonstrators.  
This means that international military forces are under pressure to perform police and 
police-like duties. Civilian and military decision-makers, however, are afraid of negative 
effects on the fighting strength and moral of their soldiers. As security gaps undermine 
the stabilization of fragile states, the military become a quasi-police force. In the 
meantime, Western armed forces are learning to use non-lethal weapons when training 
for missions abroad so that in the event of potentially violent demonstrations they do not 
only have the choice between retreating or using firearms.  
Likewise, there has also been a militarization of the police as several indicators show 
(Kraska 2007: 504). Material indicators are military weapons and technology; cultural 
indicators are military-like language and a military style; organizational indicators are the 
establishment of military-like commando structures; and operational indicators are the 
participation of police forces in high-risk missions. International players may encourage 
the militarization of the police in peace operations in two ways. First of all, they may send 
in their own robust police forces such as gendarmerie, Formed Police Units (FPU), or 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. Secondly, international stakeholders may 
encourage the militarization of the police in post-conflict states through militarized 
training and armaments programmes.  
This means that the functional need to close security gaps clashes with the principle of 
civilian police work. By encouraging militarization, international stakeholders reduce the 
risk of security gaps. The price may be high, however, if militarization overshadows 
civilian police work – for example public confidence could be lost as a result of the 
disproportionate use of force or poor crime detection results due to neglect of police skills. 
The militarization of the police also sends out conflicting signals to the public and thus 
risks undermining the credibility of the reform efforts.  
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These grey areas vary considerably and there is no sure formula for achieving the 
correct balance between civilian and military elements in international police assistance 
work. SSR guidelines allow the donor states leeway when providing international police 
assistance.4 The standard work on SSR, an OECD handbook published in 2007, does not 
go so far as to advocate the separation of police and military duties (which is a crucial 
principle of German security policy). It does, however, demand a clear separation of the 
duties of the security forces, their democratic control and a civilian, community-oriented 
police force (OECD 2007). 
2.3  International police assistance: civilian or military?  
The relationship between civilian and military elements in police-building efforts 
involving international donors in post-conflict states depends on many factors (cf. Table 
1). These can be divided into two groups: the preferences and practices of external 
stakeholders in police-building, and the conditions in the post-conflict country.  
 
Table 1: Conditions for the relationship between civilian and military elements in 
police-building  
 
Preferences and practices of external 
stakeholders  
Conditions in the post-conflict country  
 Overall concept of international 
intervention 
 Coordination 
 Power relationships of institutions 
 Security situation 
 Quality of government leadership 
 Police traditions 
 Economic and societal situation 
 
As far as the first group of conditions is concerned, an important issue is whether the 
international stakeholders are focusing on short-term increases in security or the long-
term establishment of democratically controlled institutions. For example, the United 
States’ coercive counter-narcotics strategy in Latin America has strengthened repressive 
armed forces, has merely combated the symptoms of violence, has aggravated violence in 
some regions, and has thus contributed to the continuation of conditions which 
apparently make a military form of police-building necessary (Youngers/Rosin 2005). 
Problems of coordination also influence the course of police-building. The lack of 
coordination between stakeholders who wish to promote civilian police-building and 
 
 
4  This leeway also reflects the differences in the security cultures and police traditions of both the 
intervening states and the fragile states.  
Militarized versus Civilian Policing 7
 
rule of law may open up security gaps or lead to the predominance of the military. This 
was the case, for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004 and 2005 when the European 
Union Police Mission was unable to take action against organized crime and the EU 
military force took over this task (Friesendorf 2010: Chapter 3). 
It is also important which external stakeholders dominate police-building. The 
strategic cultures of individual states and the professional identities and structures of their 
security forces strongly influence their strategies in multilateral operations.5 The police 
are more likely to become militarized if external armed forces are the main driver of local 
police-building work. One such example is Iraq, where US soldiers strengthened the 
military capacities of the Iraqi police. Civilian institutions, on the other hand, encourage 
civilian police work. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) succeeded in establishing a civilian-oriented police force in Kosovo. The 
dominance of the military is partly due to the shortage of police available for missions 
abroad.  
Apart from the preferences of the main donors, conditions in the post-conflict state 
itself also influence the relationship between civilian and military elements in police-
building. The most important factor in this respect is the security situation (Bayley/Perito 
2010: 71-72). Civilian police are overtaxed if the post-conflict situation escalates and once 
again becomes an armed conflict. In Burundi, for instance, police units were drawn into 
military conflicts during the civil war. The ensuing militarization of the police resulted in 
the police force, which on paper was civilian-oriented, being provided with military 
weapons, training and uniforms. Civilian police forces operating in small units in both 
Bosnia and Kosovo had very limited success in tackling spoilers of peace. Soldiers and 
gendarmes therefore had to operate in the grey areas between police and military duties 
themselves as well as by militarizing units of the host state’s police forces.  
Government leadership also influences the approach to police work. Poor government 
leadership encourages donors to seek pragmatic solutions, often under the exclusion of 
local stakeholders, who should, in fact, be acting as a driver for the reform efforts. For 
example, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), like the United 
Nations’ precursor mission, has executive competencies in the field of criminal 
prosecution. This is due not least to the lack of confidence in the Kosovo government.  
Police traditions are just as important. External reforms can at the best only take effect 
slowly in cases where a country does not have a tradition of democratically controlled 
police work. In some African states, the police served to uphold the rule of power elites 
and were a significant means of controlling members of the opposition and securing the 
regime. Breaking with this tradition and subjecting the police to democratic controls 
remains difficult. During the communist period, police forces in South East Europe 
worked professionally but were not subject to controls in a democratic-liberal sense. 
Institutional cultures can only be changed slowly. The state of the police also has an 
 
 
5  This is due not least to the fact that both SSR norms and international law allow a great deal of leeway 
when defining police-military fields of competence and that donor states only surrender limited 
competencies to international organizations for the deployment of ‘their’ police and soldiers.  
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influence on the chances of police reform. If this state is desolate, this is a bad omen for 
attempts to introduce sustainable police reform; there is a great temptation to aim at 
short-term, measurable results.  
The conditions in Afghanistan were not conducive to the building of a civilian police 
force even in the early years of the international intervention. In the meantime, the 
obstacles to civilian police reform have become ever greater and the militarization of the 
ANP increasingly evident (cf. table 2).6 This situation is due particularly to the 
geographical expansion and intensification of the insurgency.  
 
Table 2: Obstacles to civilian police reform in Afghanistan 
 
Preferences and practices of external 
stakeholders 
Conditions in Afghanistan 
 Neglect of public order and rule of law 
 Coordination problems 
 Dominance of the Pentagon 
 Lack of security, war 
 Poor government leadership 
 Absence of a tradition of civilian police 
work  
 Desolate state of the police 
 
The three following sections describe the transition towards military-oriented police-
building and study the problematic consequences of abandoning civilian police reform.  
3.  Police reform after the fall of the Taliban 
From the military point of view, the USA’s response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 
was successful in Afghanistan: The Taliban regime was defeated within just a few weeks. 
The USA relied on its supremacy in the air, the deployment of special forces, and 
cooperation with the Northern Alliance. It soon emerged, however – as was also the case 
later in Iraq – that it is easier to destroy a (quasi-)state than to build a functioning state.  
At the beginning of 2002, the international donors decided in favour of a lead 
nations approach in order to stabilize Afghanistan and reform and establish the Afghan 
security sector. Germany assumed responsibility for coordinating international 
assistance for building the ANP. The problems with this lead nations approach soon 
became evident. For example, police reform required close coordination with judicial 
and defence reform as well as with drugs control and the demobilization, disarmament 
 
 
6  Cf. also Friesendorf (2011). 
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and reintegration of former combatants. There was, however, a serious lack of 
coordination between these sectors and the lead nations involved.  
The biggest problem was the inadequate provision of funds. The strategy of ensuring 
stability with limited financial and personnel means (“light footprint strategy”) reflected 
the preferences of the Bush administration, which was opposed to “nation-building”. This 
strategy denied Afghanistan the necessary help for self-help. After over two decades of 
war, the political, economic and social situation in the country was catastrophic. The 
interim-government under President Hamid Karzai depended almost exclusively on 
international donors, who at the beginning of the international intervention, at least, were 
investing too little (Jones 2009).  
Many Afghans supported the presence of international forces in their country because 
they had only considered the Taliban as a necessary evil to counter the rule of the 
warlords. It soon became evident, however, that the international stakeholders were not 
able to fill the power vacuum following the collapse of the Taliban. The warlords knew 
how to take advantage of the initial chaos to assume control of territories, institutions and 
people. But the international stakeholders also bear responsibility for security gaps. The 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was originally a small force, and it was 
only after October 2003 that ISAF, which had been under NATO command since August 
2003, gradually extended its presence to cover the whole of Afghanistan. Equally 
problematic was the fact that the international troops did not perform any police-like 
functions. In interpreting the ISAF mandate, they ignored the lessons learned from 
experiences in the Balkans, namely that the military must also take on police duties 
during the initial phase when there is scarcely any international or national police 
presence (Friesendorf 2010).  
The American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which was conducted in 
parallel with ISAF, was even more problematic. The Bush administration was fixated on 
the hunt for al-Qaeda. The OEF therefore supported local potentates who helped with this 
task. Many of them had little backing from the local population, however (Chayes 2006). 
Support from Pakistan’s military government also proved counter-productive in some 
respects because Pakistan provided the Taliban with safe havens to which they could 
retreat and thus undermined the international effort. On the whole, US strategists 
considered Afghanistan to be less important that Iraq. This indifference led to a drop in 
Afghan support for the international presence, particularly in the South and the East of 
the country. The Pashtuns, who comprise the largest population group in Afghanistan, 
accounting for almost 40 percent of the population, had in any case always had 
reservations about the post-Taliban order with its strong representation of Tajiks. These 
grievances served to nurture the insurgency.  
Armed groups with quasi-police roles hardly helped to guarantee public order. Instead 
of civilian police, there were militias who operated on a military basis under the control of 
the local potentates. This situation was the result of Afghanistan’s recent history. In the 
turmoil of the 1970s, Mohammed Daoud Khan had used the police against members of 
the opposition. The police were subjected to strong military influences during the war in 
the 1980s – for example, the Ministry of Interior Affairs had armoured units. The police 
were dissolved or fought for rival warlords during the years of civil war in the early 
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1990s. The Taliban established a morals police which helped them to enforce their harsh 
interpretation of Islam.  
In other words, the police were hardly in a position to gain public confidence 
following the collapse of the Taliban. Many ‘members of the police force’ demanded 
money from the local population, consumed drugs, were involved with local warlords and 
violated human rights. Moreover, few of them could even read licence plates or identification 
papers.  
The international stakeholders were thus not able to reform an existing police force. 
On the contrary, it was a question of establishing completely new police structures. Here 
the international donors were assisted by a nucleus of former police officers, many of 
whom had undergone training in the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany or 
the German Democratic Republic. Their work was often most professional in the sense 
that they provided effective protection for the regime. But they only had a rudimentary 
understanding of civilian, community-oriented police work. The high rate of illiteracy 
among the Afghan police was a particular problem. Loyalty was a further huge obstacle to 
police reform: Many Afghan police were under the control of local potentates who had 
integrated their militias into the police. Another problem was the fact that many members 
of parliament or government authorities were involved in crime and corruption.7 Civil 
society was weak and therefore hardly able to control the ANP. 
3.1 The beginning of German police assistance 
Against the background of these difficulties, international SSR attempts appear all too 
optimistic in retrospect. The German Federal Government saw itself obliged to engage in 
Afghanistan in order to demonstrate solidarity with the USA. Germany was thereby able 
to profit from its traditionally good relations with Afghanistan. However, the Federal 
Government underestimated the situation in Afghanistan and raised unrealistic 
expectations with regard to police reform.  
The first German police advisors arrived in March 2002 and opened the German 
Coordination Office. The German police programme (originally German Police Project 
Office, later renamed German Police Project Team, GPPT) began its work in 2002. 
Germany initially concentrated its attention on refurbishing the Kabul National Police 
Academy and on training commissioned officers (saran) and non-commissioned officers 
(satanman). Commissioned officers underwent three years of training; non-
commissioned officers one year. 1,500 commissioned officers and 500 non-commissioned 
officers began training in August 2002 (Perito 2009: 3). The Federal Government hoped 
that the intensive training of senior and middle ranks would later enable the Afghans to 
take over police training themselves.  
Despite making a certain amount of progress, the German police programme was just 
a drop in the ocean. It was limited to Kabul and later to certain districts in North 
 
 
7  “How can corruption be combated if there is so much corruption within the attorney-general’s office?” 
This rhetorical question was posed by a UN staff member during a conversation in Kabul, July 2009.  
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Afghanistan. The situation was further compounded by disregard for the reform of the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs. Germany’s financial stake in building the ANP amounted to 
13 million Euros in 2002 (Deutscher Bundestag 2010: 6). In 2003, it invested 12.5 million 
Euros in the build-up of the ANP; 10.4 million in 2004; and 10.3 million in 2005 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2010: 6). Germany began training the ANP with nine instructors 
and short-term experts in 2003. In 2004, there were 25 experts, and in 2005, 37 short-term 
experts (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 3).8 There were also permanent members of staff 
stationed in Afghanistan. Their number rose from 16 in 2002 to 40 (2003), 59 (2004) and 
73 (2005).9 By the beginning of 2006, Germany had trained 3,600 Afghan commissioned 
and non-commissioned police officers – against the background of an estimated overall 
ANP force of 50,000 (Deutscher Bundestag 2006: 2).10  
3.2  The USA’s involvement in police reform 
As Germany was not training the lower ranks of the ANP, the patrolmen (satunkai), these 
did not undergo any form of training until the USA finally closed the gap. The USA had 
been worried from an early stage about the slow progress of the German programme. 
Washington therefore began its own police programme in 2003. A year later, the USA 
was already investing approximately 224 million dollars in the ANP (United States 
Government Accountability Office 2008: 5). Germany was still officially the lead nation, 
but de facto the USA dominated police-building in Afghanistan due to its massive input 
of funds.  
The USA concentrated its efforts primarily on the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 
which represented the major part of the ANP. A police training centre was built in Kabul 
for this purpose, which served as the prototype for seven regional training centres (Perito 
2009: 4). Apart from the AUP, there were further specialized elements of the ANP (whose 
structures and titles changed over the years). The Criminal Investigation Department was 
intended to solve crimes. It was the task of the Afghan Border Police to secure border 
regions against smugglers and insurgents. From the point of view of the USA, the border 
police were an additional force in the fight against insurgents, even if they were 
considered particularly corrupt. The Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan conducted 
operations against the drugs industry and received support from British and US police 
 
 
8  The sources regarding the number of police personnel usually do not differentiate precisely between long-
term experts, instructors and short-term experts. The task of the long-term experts is coordination rather 
than training. Instructors are definitely involved in training the ANP. This is not necessarily the case with 
short-term experts. The authors are grateful to Jörn Meyer for this information.  
9  Number of permanent staff over the entire year. I.e. the number of permanent staff at any given time is 
usually considerably lower; cf. Deutscher Bundestag (2007: 3). 
10  The actual size of the ANP was only guesswork. The number of Afghan police was unclear even in 2005. It 
is only since 2009 that international stakeholders have tried to systematically determine the actual 
strength of the ANP. This was difficult because police chiefs often overestimated the numbers of their 
staff in order to rake in their pay (“ghost police”).  
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officers and special forces.11 The anti-terror units of the ANP were a further player in 
high-risk operations. The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) also played a 
particularly important role. Their gendarmes were supposed to be able to perform police 
work at demonstrations as robustly as necessary but in a way which would de-escalate the 
situation as far as possible. Over the years, this original task has been supplanted by that 
of safeguarding high-risk areas.  
Germany, the USA and other donor states supported the ANP by providing training, 
equipment and information, whereby an important role was played by Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). This support was often not coordinated with the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs in Kabul or other international partners, but adapted to meet local 
requirements.12  
The United States’ dominant role in building up the police was uncontested. 
Responsibility for the police programme was in the hands of the State Department or its 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which in turn 
commissioned DynCorp, a private security company. DynCorp mainly employed retired 
members of the US police or soldiers for its police-building work in Afghanistan. Few of 
them were professional instructors. Many of the Afghan translators required for the 
training programme, which was held in English, were poorly trained and unfamiliar 
with police terminology (Perito 2009: 4). 
The immediate objective of this intensified police training programme was to protect 
the Afghan presidential elections in October 2004. For this purpose, DynCorp established 
a “train the trainer” programme, under which more than 800 Afghan police were trained 
as instructors within three weeks. These new instructors then trained Afghan patrolmen. 
Training for new recruits lasted eight weeks compared with just two weeks for recruits 
with previous experience. Specialized elements of the ANP received additional training. 
The fact that over 20,000 Afghan police underwent training prior to the presidential 
elections was thus largely due to the USA (United States Government Accountability 
Office 2005: 19).13 
 
 
11  Conversation with a UN staff member, Kabul, October 2010.  
12  According to a civilian NATO employee, the coordination of the PRTs was almost impossible because 
they only received instructions from the capitals of those states which had troops in Afghanistan. 
Presentation, ISAF Headquarters, 27 September 2009.  
13  As with all other figures regarding the number of trained police in Afghanistan, caution is called for here. 
The figures say nothing about how many police were trained for the first time or underwent repeated 
training. Many may well have undergone repeated training as their personal details were not recorded 
systematically (which was difficult as many Afghans only used their first name and had no identity 
papers; police training was attractive for these people because they received board and lodging whilst 
undergoing training). Furthermore, many members of the police were still hardly fit for employment even 
after training and stayed away from work. For many years, there was no database with information about 
which member of the police had undergone which form of training in Afghanistan as a whole.  
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4.  Expansion of police assistance and militarization of the ANP 
The parliamentary elections of September 2005 were accompanied by many attacks. 
There was now no longer any doubt about the existence of an insurgency. This increased 
the pressure on Germany. Nevertheless, the Federal Government and the Länder did not 
significantly increase the funds available for police-building. As in the initial years, 
Germany continued to train the higher police ranks. The German budget for building the 
ANP amounted to 15.9 million Euros in 2006 and 11 million Euros in 2007. It was then 
raised to 34.5 million in 2008 and to 53.7 million Euros per year in 2009 (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2010: 6). But there was still no substantial increase in the number of German 
police personnel in Afghanistan.  
4.1  The beginning of the European Union Police Mission Afghanistan 
(EUPOL) 
The most significant change on the European side was the beginning of the European 
Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan in 2007. The mission was essentially a 
German initiative. The Federal Government wanted to reduce the pressure from the USA 
by transferring responsibility to the EU (Germany had only 43 permanent members of 
staff in Afghanistan at the beginning of the EUPOL mission). EUPOL’s main task was to 
advise high-ranking officials at the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs as well as ANP 
officers at strategic level. The EU set out to have 195 international EUPOL staff in 
Afghanistan by the end of March 2008; EUPOL’s budget of 43.6 million Euros was paid 
out of the budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the period from the end 
of May 2007 to the end of March 2008 (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 3-5). However, these 
targets were not reached: In March 2008, there were only 95 police experts in Afghanistan 
instead of the planned 195 (Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 4). The EUPOL mission also 
included German police experts who worked in parallel to their colleagues in the German 
Police Project Team (GPPT), which continued to operate.  
The majority of EU states favoured a civilian police model. However, the problems of 
the mission soon came to light: In many cases, individual EU Member States tried to 
change EUPOL’s mandate; the EU did not achieve the goals stated in the mandate; the 
heterogeneity of the mission led to internal friction; the worsening security situation 
limited the freedom of movement of EUPOL staff; and there were problems coordinating 
EUPOL with ISAF, GPPT and other international stakeholders (Gross 2009). 
4.2  The militarization of the police  
In the course of time, the role of EUPOL, GPPT and other donor states was increasingly 
overshadowed by that of the USA. The US Defense Department already took over from 
the State Department as the main player in training and restructuring the ANP in April 
2005. The State Department continued to be responsible for managing the contracts for 
police training as well as for the mentoring of the ANP leadership. Officially, there was a 
separation of tasks: The Pentagon provided funding, personnel and infrastructure, 
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asserted political pressure and established contacts with the Afghan Ministry of Interior 
Affairs, whereas EUPOL provided the civilian police expertise.14 In practical terms, 
however, the Pentagon now determined the strategy for police reform because it provided 
the most funding and the most personnel. 
The main stakeholders at the Pentagon were the Office of Security Cooperation – 
Afghanistan, which was renamed Combined Security Transition Command – 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in 2006. This institution was entrusted with training both the 
ANP and the ANA. When referring to the ANP and the ANA, the Pentagon spoke of the 
“Afghan security forces” – a term which semantically already implies a fuzzy division of 
duties between the military and the police. In 2005, the State Department provided funds 
of 424.5 million dollars, even more than the Pentagon, which was investing 200 million 
dollars in the ANP. In 2006, however, the funds provided by the State Department only 
amounted to 58.5 million dollars, whereas the Pentagon spent over a billion dollars 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2008b: 7). In 2007, the Pentagon took over all the costs. That year 
the costs incurred by the USA for building the ANP amounted to approximately 2.7 
billion dollars. Altogether, the USA invested approximately 6.2 billion dollars in training 
and equipping the ANP between 2002 and 2008 (United States Government 
Accountability Office 2008: 11). A member of the German police described Germany’s 
replacement by the USA as lead nation as follows: “It was as if Liechtenstein were to open 
a police academy in the Balkans and then we Germans were to come along”.15 
The United State’s engagement produced mixed results; for instance, an official 
report in November 2006 stated that the American police programme had insufficient 
means and personnel.16 But there were also successes. For example, the USA asserted 
itself against the Afghan government and ensured a reduction in the number of officers 
compared with the number of subordinates. This made it possible to reduce costs and 
increase effectiveness. The handwriting of the Pentagon/CSTC-A is clearest in the 
accelerated training of ANP members. It is claimed that just under 150,000 ANP 
members were trained between 2003 and 2008 (Legon 2009).  
The militarization of the ANP can be illustrated by the indicators mentioned in 
section 2. As far as material indicators were concerned, the USA in particular supplied 
military weapons such as AK-47 assault rifles, machine guns and grenade launchers. 
From the cultural point of view, international stakeholders strengthened the ANP’s 
military identity since many instructors, partners and mentors were active or former 
soldiers and their approach and language were thus military-like.17 From the 
organizational point of view, the USA adapted the ANP’s commando and logistical 
structure to that of the ANA (Murray 2007: 118). Finally, from the operational point of 
view, regular units of the ANP continued to take part in high-risk missions. In some 
 
 
14  Conversations with EUPOL staff and a British diplomat, Kabul, July 2009.  
15  Conversation, Kabul National Police Academy, October 2010.  
16  Inspectors General, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense (2006). 
17  Socialization effects are particularly strong in the case of partnering and mentoring, as instructors and 
trainees work and live together. 
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cases, the ANP participated in offensive combat operations against the Taliban. The only 
difference between the ANA and the ANP was often the fact that the former operated 
more professionally.18 
Washington considered the widespread presence of the ANP to be necessary in order 
to prevent armed opposition forces from taking over control of the people. This notion 
complied with the Afghan practice (which in turn dated back to Soviet reforms) of having 
as many police stations and control points as possible throughout the country.19 The USA 
– and increasingly also the Europeans – argued that this broad-based deployment of the 
ANP necessitated help towards self-protection; that is to say, militarization. Indeed 
opponents of the government were killing and wounding more and more Afghan police. 
An estimated 1,290 police were killed in 2008. Many died in attacks on remote roadblocks 
or police stations.  
4.3  The Focused District Development (FDD) Programme 
From the end of 2007, the international stakeholders concentrated on the Focused 
District Development (FDD) Programme. This involved an evaluation following which 
the entire Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) in a given district was withdrawn and subject 
to eight weeks of training at the Police Training Center (PTC). During this period, the 
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) took over the duties of the AUP.20 Upon 
completion of training, the police returned to their district where they received post-
training support from international mentors and partners. The latter were organized in 
Police Mentor Teams (PMT) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams 
(POMLT).21 Apart from providing assistance in terms of training and equipment, the 
international partners also helped the ANP by improving infrastructure, particularly the 
construction of police stations.  
The training courses put the main emphasis on military skills such as the handling of 
weapons, the establishment of roadblocks and the identification of improvised explosive 
devices (IED). Approximately seven of the eight weeks of police training were devoted to 
learning military skills. Only approximately one week remained for learning about such 
matters as Afghanistan’s constitution, the conduct of criminal proceedings or human 
rights (Chilton et al. 2009: 60; Bayley/Perito 2010: 23). The civilian content of the basic 
police training was reduced further with effect from November 2008. Military-type 
 
 
18  Cf. eye-witness account in Beattie (2008: 222). 
19  For example, approx. 11,000 police were present in around 700 places in North Afghanistan in 2009. 
Talks with a Bundeswehr officer, Berlin, 2 July 2010.  
20  The ANCOP was more popular with the Afghans than the AUP. The higher quality of the ANCOP’s work 
was due to the relatively strict admission criteria and a training course lasting 16 weeks. Furthermore, the 
ANCOP was recruited and deployed on a national basis and was therefore less susceptible to local 
corruption. Cf. ICG (2008: 5). 
21  The USA mainly supplied POMLT, the Europeans PMT.  
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training replaced lessons on community-oriented police work, domestic violence and 
women’s rights (Cordesman 2010: 113). 
The main programme for basic police training was the so-called “Basic 8” (eight stands 
for the number of weeks of training), which was drawn up by private security firms. This 
curriculum also contains many elements of civilian police work. However, the 
international stakeholders adapted the curriculum to meet their own respective 
requirements and strategic cultures. Furthermore, elements such as recognizing false 
identity papers could not be taught due to illiteracy among many police trainees. The 
result was the militarization of ANP training, particularly in high-risk regions, and a 
confusing proliferation of syllabuses, not only for the specialized elements of the ANP but 
also for the AUP.  
4.4  The reform of the Ministry of Interior Affairs  
The reform of the Ministry of Interior Affairs also proved to be difficult. Ministerial 
reform was a huge task due to the presence of people in the Ministry who had no interest 
in democratically controlled police work and were alleged to be involved in corruption 
and organized crime (the most lucrative source of income was drug trafficking) (Wilder 
2007). An electronic pay system was introduced to stem corruption and prevent senior 
officers from withholding the wages of their subordinates (Perito 2009: 12). Further 
problems were mismanagement and failure to delegate tasks to subordinates (a problem 
which reflected both the Soviet legacy as well as traditional Afghan hierarchization). 
There was no separation of ministerial and police duties at the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs: The Minister was de facto the country’s head of police. He made up to 50 
decisions per day, many of which were not implemented.22  
The USA’s dominance in the field of ministerial reform was obvious. In 2006 there 
were almost one hundred American police for every European police officer.23 Efforts to 
strengthen police competencies were insufficient, however. One official at the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs said: “When I say that I need weapons they [the international 
stakeholders] bring thousands. When I say that I need criminal investigation equipment, 
they don’t know what to do.”24  
International stakeholders were thus more concerned about the slow progress of the 
build-up of the ANP than about the lack of civilian police elements, for example in the 
Focused District Development Programme (FDD). After all, a training cycle – involving 
evaluation, the eight-week training programme and mentoring – took a year and was only 
able to reach an average of around 70 members of the police in a district. This was due in 
part to the limited strength of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) which 
only had a few thousand members. Furthermore, the ANCOP had a high attrition rate as 
 
 
22  Conversation with EUPOL staff member, Kabul, September 2009.  
23  Conversation with EUPOL staff member, Kabul, October 2010.  
24  Quoted in: ICG (2008: 9-10). 
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it had a high operations pace and was deployed in the most dangerous districts. A further 
reason for the slow progress of FDD was the shortage of international partners and 
mentors. Although DynCorp managed to provide 540 of the proposed 551 police 
mentors, the USA was only able to provide 746 of the 2,358 military mentors intended 
for training the ANP and working in the FDD Programme (particularly to provide 
security during the mentoring phase) (United States Government Accountability Office 
2008: 34).  
In mid-2008, it was estimated that the number of ANP members had risen to 
approximately 80,000. However, not a single ANP unit was graded fully capable; two 
thirds even received the worst marks possible (United States Government Accountability 
Office 2008: 32). What is more, according to a report by the British Foreign Office in 
2008, 60 percent of the Afghan police stationed in Helmand took drugs.25  
5.  The police and counterinsurgency 
2009 marked the official beginning of the fight against insurgency in Afghanistan 
(counterinsurgency, COIN). General Petraeus and other US strategists had developed the 
COIN strategy in Iraq. ISAF Commander-in-Chief General McChrystal now also 
implemented COIN in Afghanistan under President Obama. The main focus was to 
provide improved protection for the civilian population and strengthen the Afghan state. 
A more efficient ANP was an important element in this effort.  
As a result, international stakeholders increased their investments in the ANP with 
effect from 2009. This trend continued in 2010. At the London Afghanistan Conference 
in January 2010, the international donors decided to transfer responsibility for security to 
the Afghan government by 2014. One aim was to enlarge the ANP to a total of 134,000 
members by autumn 2011. In December 2010, the Federal Government announced that 
the ANP had a strength of 113,000 members (Bundesregierung 2010: 26). This 
enlargement was primarily due to the increase in US soldiers available for training 
purposes. However, the emphasis was on quantity rather than quality. The general 
responsible for police-building stated that more civilian instructors and mentors were 
necessary.26  
The shortage of civilian police expertise had consequences. Speaking in 2009, a 
member of EUPOL staff estimated the ability of the ANP to conduct intelligence-led 
policing as “non-existent”.27 A year later, a UN official stated that even members of the 
police working in highly sensitive positions in the field of crime detection were often 
illiterate.28 The fact that they remained in office despite their incompetence reflected 
 
 
25  Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, “60 pc of Helmand Police use drugs”, 18 February 2009. 
26  Interview with Major General Stuart Beare, NTM-A, Kabul, 6 October 2010. See also Deb Riechmann, 
“NATO: 740 trainers still needed for Afghan forces”, Associated Press, February 13, 2011. 
27  Conversation, Kabul, July 2009.  
28  Conversation, Kabul, October 2010.  
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Afghan clientelism, on the one hand,29 but also the discrepancies in international police 
assistance, on the other. This was also shown by little things. For example, the military 
proposed new police uniforms which looked more like soldiers’ uniforms. The few civilian 
police who were present at the coordination meetings were hardly able to raise their 
concerns in view of the larger numbers of military representatives.30  
5.1  German efforts 
In 2010, Germany increased its expenditure on the GPPT to around 50 million Euros per 
year. Added to this was the German contribution to the Law and Order Trust Fund for 
Afghanistan totalling 30 million Euros for 2010, from which ANP wages are paid 
(Bundesregierung 2010: 29). Furthermore, German contributions to the EU also went 
directly or indirectly to help build the ANP. At the London Afghanistan Conference in 
January 2010, the Federal Government announced an additional increase in German 
police-building personnel, raising numbers to 260; 200 police experts were to work for the 
GPPT, 60 for EUPOL. The renewed prioritization of the bilateral programme, which had 
begun as early as mid-2008, showed that the Federal Government did not consider 
EUPOL to be sufficiently effective.  
Since the beginning of 2009, Germany was also involved in the FDD programmes in 
the area of Regional Command North, which was under German command. The Federal 
Government made 45 members of the military police available for this purpose.31 It was 
their task to teach members of the ANP military skills and to protect members of the 
German police outside the camp. This police training led to what must probably be 
considered the closest military-police cooperation in the history of the Federal 
Republic. According to one member of the German police, this “close cooperation 
between the police and the Bundeswehr is absolutely new. Normally the BMVg [Federal 
Ministry of Defence] and the BMI [Federal Ministry of the Interior] avoid each other.”32 
Despite this unusually close cooperation, the BMVg, BMI and the Federal Foreign 
Office (AA) attempted to maintain the precept of separating the military and police.33 
Accordingly, members of the military police and civilian police assumed responsibility for 
training “in clearly defined, non-interchangeable functions”.34 Members of the military 
 
 
29  Powerful relatives often prevent a person’s dismissal. Conversation with a member of UNDP staff, Kabul, 
July 2009.  
30  Conversation with an officer of NTM-A, Kabul, October 2010.  
31  Military police have been supporting the training of the Afghan police in North Afghanistan since April 
2007. Further members of the military police worked as bodyguards, as military police within the field 
camps and on compiling evidence following attacks on the Bundeswehr.  
32  Conversation, Kabul, 5 October 2010.  
33  It is not clear in how far the precept of separating the military and police, which limits the possibilities of 
deploying the Bundeswehr in Germany, also applies to missions abroad. In practice, however, this precept 
is also the guiding principle abroad. For instance, the Bundeswehr cannot easily be placed under police 
command. 
34  Interview at the German Federal Ministry of Defence , Berlin, 29 October 2010.  
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police trained members of the Afghan police force in the fields of weapons and firing, 
unarmed combat, checkpoint training (including searches of vehicles and persons) as well 
as security duties. The primacy of the police applied in the case of partnering and 
mentoring: For example, members of the police were responsible for negotiating with 
district chiefs of police, whereas the military police concentrated on security tasks.35 The 
GPPT was specifically only a partner to NATO. One high-ranking representative of the 
GPPT emphasized: “We are not under the command of the military”.36 The GPPT also 
kept its distance with regard to the gendarmes of the ANCOP. The BMI prohibited the 
training of members of the ANCOP after the force was officially classified as a 
gendarmerie, that is to say a paramilitary unit.37 The fact that Germany did not supply any 
weapons to the ANP was also characteristic of the German approach. Furthermore, as far 
as teaching content was concerned, Germany tried to prevent police training from 
become mere crash courses – the BMI professed to focus ANP training on civilian police 
skills and the protection of human rights.38 All in all therefore, Germany continued to 
support the “principle of sustainability”.39 
Nevertheless, despite this caution, the FDD Programme was difficult for the Germans. 
German police and police unions described police operations outside the fortified 
military camps and the Police Training Centers as the most dangerous operations 
undertaken by German police. The police were therefore equipped with military weapons, 
bullet-proof vests and helmets (Ritter 2010: 17), and only their blue uniforms 
distinguished them from members of the military police. On visits to ANP districts, there 
were often five Bundeswehr soldiers for every one member of the German police.  
The poor security situation made it more difficult to recruit German police to take part 
in the programme. The police saw the main risk in partnering, which was a key element of 
FDD. One German policeman said: “FDD means going to die.”40 The GdP (one of the 
German police trade unions) stressed that the German police could not be sent into war.41 
German police and officials at the ministries emphasized repeatedly: “We are not 
soldiers.”42 The risks involved deterred many capable members of the German police from 
applying to take part in the mission. This is certainly one of the reasons why only 165 
 
 
35  Own observations in a district in the Balkh province, mid-October 2010.  
36  Interview with Police Director Dr. Lars Gerdes, Kabul, 6 October 2010. 
37  Conversation with a member of the GPPT, Afghanistan, October 2010.  
38  Conversations with members of the German military police, Hannover, June 2010, and with members of 
staff at the BMI, Berlin, 9 December 2010.  
39  Interview with Police Director Markus Bierschenk, Head of the GPPT at the Kabul National Police 
Academy, 11 October 2010.  
40  Quoted in: Deutsche Polizisten fürchten Afghanistan-Desaster, Spiegel Online, 1 April 2010, 
www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,686968,00.html (10.01.2011). 
41  Press release by the Federal Executive Committee of the German Police Trade Union (GdP), 10 February 
2010, www.gdp.de/id/p100204/$file/p100204AghanistanbewaffneterKonflikt.pdf (10.01.2011). 
42  A police officer at the Federal Ministry of the Interior, telephone conversation, September 2010.  
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German police were involved in the GPPT in October 2010, once again well below the 
target of 200.43  
The poor security situation also limited the radius of the German police in 
Afghanistan. They were only able to go out on day tours as they had to spend the nights 
in the field camps. This reduced the number of districts visited to those in the vicinity of 
field camps – and to those in the – by Afghan standards – relatively secure provinces of 
Balkh, Tahar and Badakshan; Germany was not involved in FDD in the embattled 
province of Kunduz. In other words, Germany was not actively engaged throughout 
North Afghanistan. It was even less visibly present in Afghanistan as a whole. 
The difficulties with the German police programme were obvious – even in the 
relatively safe districts. Speaking to the chief of police in a district that had already 
undergone the one-year training and partnering programme, the Head of the Police 
Mentoring Team learned that over a dozen of the roughly 90 members of the AUP who 
had been trained by Germany were no longer turning up for work. Further members of 
the police force had been assigned as bodyguards to the provincial governor and were 
thus no longer available to the district.44 
These and further obstacles caused many members of the German police to despair of 
police-building. The members of the GPPT saw the strict security precautions and the 
presence of the many military police as being necessary but also as an obstacle to 
establishing contacts with the Afghan people. One member of the GPPT said: “I cannot 
perform any effective police work when I’m sitting in an armoured vehicle.”45 
5.2  Forcing the pace of involvement and the shift in the EUPOL Mission 
Whereas the German Police Project Team (GPPT) sought to work effectively under 
difficult conditions and with relatively few means, EUPOL was faced with greater 
problems. Many members of staff spoke of a failed mission.46 With only 280 international 
members of staff in autumn 2010, the mission was still a long way from achieving its 
target of 400.47 One positive aspect was that EUPOL extended its presence to a larger 
number of provinces and was able to provide an important impetus for police reform and 
police training in those areas. EUPOL staff were, however, extremely dependent on the 
military. EUPOL received assistance if ISAF had sufficient free capacity to protect EUPOL 
 
 
43  Apart from the poor security situation, recruitment was made difficult by the fact that many members of 
the Länder police still did not profit career-wise from taking part in a mission abroad. The high 
allowances for foreign missions and hazardous duties could not compensate for these obstacles. For many 
senior police officers in Germany, the absence of members of their staff led to considerable planning 
problems, not least as a result of cuts in the budgets of the Länder police in recent years. The Federal 
Police (Bundespolizei), on the other hand, created more career incentives and their budget was increased.  
44  Own observations in a district in the province of Balkh, October 2010.   
45  Conversation, Kabul, October 2010.  
46  Conversations with members of EUPOL, Kabul, July and October 2009 and October 2010. See also House 
of Lords (2011).  
47  Interview with Harald Händel, EUPOL spokesman, Kabul, 5 October 2010.  
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staff in their operations outside the field camps. But this was not always the case, creating 
security hazards for EUPOL staff (House of Lords 2011).  
The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) demanded 
that EUPOL participate in critical areas such as combating and investigating drug 
trafficking and terrorism. EUPOL, however, did not have sufficient funds or staff and was 
sceptical about counterinsurgency. The mission concentrated therefore on the Afghan 
Uniformed Civilian Police (AUCP) and the Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID).  
The EU Member States were also sceptical about EUPOL and the mission was 
therefore under pressure to produce measurable successes. One element was its presence 
in a larger number of provinces, another its participation in ANP basic training. EUPOL 
staff members were responsible for training members of the Afghan police over a three-
week period under the City Police and Justice Programme. This training for members of 
the Afghan police, approximately 90 percent of whom were illiterate, focused on practical 
skills such as searching for weapons and explosives at roadblocks.48 Such military-like 
training at tactical level would have been unthinkable in 2007 when EUPOL set out with 
the aim of conducting a civilian-oriented reform of the ANP through mentoring at 
strategic level.  
Nevertheless, not even this increased training effort was able to help EUPOL to 
strengthen its profile. This is shown by the fact that high-ranking representatives of the 
Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs often confused the GPPT and EUPOL, or thought that 
they were one and the same thing.49 EUPOL therefore had difficulties in achieving even its 
minimum goal and creating its own niche vis-à-vis NATO.  
5.3  The ANP and counterinsurgency 
The ANP became an integral part of counterinsurgency efforts from 2009 onwards. This 
was due to the poor security situation and the expansion of the armed conflict to parts of 
the country which had hitherto been peaceful. The police were a favourite victim of 
attacks because they were seen as soft targets compared with soldiers and were stationed 
in small numbers at remote police outposts. More and more international stakeholders 
argued therefore that the ANP needed robust help for self-help. The COIN strategy 
supplied the conceptual framework for providing this help. According to this strategy, 
counterinsurgency must focus on the population. The police are important if the state is 
to win the race against insurgents to gain the confidence of the people. Police work is 
thereby often subordinated to the military goal (Kilkullen 2009: 112). Consequently, the 
US-led Counterinsurgency Academy near Kabul also trained members of the AUP.50 
 
 
48  Observations during police training in October 2010 in Kabul; Examination of the syllabus.  
49  Interview with a member of EUPOL, Kabul, October 2010.  
50  Conversation with US instructor, COIN Academy, 3 October 2009.  
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The USA’s counterinsurgency strategy differentiated between the elements “clear”, 
“hold”, “build” and “transfer”: clearing areas of insurgents, holding areas, rebuilding 
them, and transferring responsibility to the Afghans. The ANP is mainly important in the 
phases of holding onto an area. It is also expected to protect rebuilding activities and later 
work independently to ensure security.  
In implementing this strategy, the USA and the Afghan Government concentrated on 
certain particularly important districts, so-called “key terrain districts”. These 80 or so 
districts are strategically important because they form major population or economic 
centres, have important infrastructures and are located on main trunk roads. The ANP 
was to demonstrate state presence in order to prevent the return of insurgents after they 
had been expelled from a district.  
This presence in dangerous districts called for the police to be able to switch quickly 
between police and military mode. Planners, instructors, partners and mentors 
concentrated on improving the ANP’s skills in the fields of mobility, use of firearms, and 
communication (US Department of Defense 2010: 122). Eight weeks of basic training 
allowed no time for strengthening civilian police capabilities, although instructors did try 
to identify basic problems such as drug consumption, and included the protection of 
human rights and the proportionality of means in all elements of training. ANP wages 
were also increased in order to make offers of payment from the Taliban less attractive. 
Progress was particularly marked in the ANCOP, where the number of police quitting the 
service prematurely sank significantly because members of the police received more 
money and were able to spend more time with their families.51 The donors also increased 
their investments in literacy courses. For example the German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ, since 1 January 2011 GIZ (German International Cooperation)), working on 
behalf of the German Foreign Office, planned the launch of literacy containers and 
literacy courses for the ANP in 100 districts in North Afghanistan.52 
Nevertheless, the priority of military skills and the pressure to increase the size of the 
ANP as quickly as possible thwarted these attempts at improvements. The fact that only 
around five percent of ANP members did not complete FDD training successfully 
indicates that the focus was on quantity rather than quality (Cordesman 2010: 104). 
Hardly anyone failed even ANCOP training.53 The instructors were under pressure to 
produce results although some members of the ANCOP were hardly able to read or write 
(officially a precondition for applying).  
5.4  The implementation of the new strategy in 2010 
The donors further accelerated police-building in the course of 2010. In autumn 2010, 
members of the ANP were being trained at 38 locations in Afghanistan. Many police 
 
 
51  Interview with Major General Stuart Beare, NTM-A, Kabul, 6 October 2010. 
52  Interview with Dr. Jochen Salow, GTZ, Kabul, 10 October 2010.  
53  Conversations with Carabinieri instructors, Central Training Center, Kabul, October 2010.  
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training centres were located at or in the vicinity of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 
The NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) was now the main stakeholder in 
building the ANP and ANA. This mission united all international training components 
except those of the EU. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A) continued to exist as part of the NTM-A. The Integrated Joint Command was 
responsible for building the ANP and the ANA at operational level. Tremendous funding 
was available: The NTM-A provided approximately one billion US dollars per month for 
training, equipping and paying the Afghan security forces (Bundesregierung 2010: 20). 
While much of the funding was destined for the ANA, NTM-A spent around 3,5 billion 
US dollars annually on police-building (House of Lords 2011: 14), or around 300 million 
US dollars a month. In autumn 2010, approximately 950 members of the NTM-A were 
responsible for this task.54 Although there was an almost equal ratio of civilian to military 
personnel, many of the civilian staff had a military background and the military had a 
considerable influence on the approach to police-building.55 Furthermore, over 2,000 
members of staff came from just two US institutions, namely the CSTC-A (approx. 1,500) 
and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (528, all 
recruited by DynCorp); almost all the members of the CSTC-A were soldiers (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2010: 3). 
Both the primacy of the military and the imbalance of funding were partially caused by 
the Afghan government itself. In autumn 2010, approximately half the higher ranking 
staff at the Ministry of Interior Affairs were military officers, not least because Interior 
Minister Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, the successor to Hanif Atmar, was a former ANA 
chief of general staff who had brought former combatants to the Ministry with him. These 
officers had expertise in military rather than police matters.56 Their dominance was also 
evident during the reform of the Ministry of Interior Affairs: In autumn 2010, there were 
approximately 230 international mentors and advisers at the Ministry.57 The most 
important role was played by about 25 mentors who advised the Minister, the four Vice-
Ministers and the heads of the directorates-general. Almost all of these mentors were 
officers, most of them colonels from the USA.58 The predominance of military mentors 
was also obvious at the subordinate level, where around 25 private contractors were 
responsible for reforming the Ministry in addition to US officers. These contractors were 
almost all former US officers. Europe only supplied a small fraction of the mentors. The 
reforms were steered by the Ministerial Development Board (MDB), which was founded 
at the beginning of 2009 and at the end of 2010 was dominated by the USA with little 
 
 
54  Interview with Major General Stuart Beare, NTM-A, Kabul, 6 October 2010. 
55  Admittedly, the basic decisions were taken in the NATO bodies which are controlled by the NATO 
Member States. The civilian control of the armed forces thus remained intact, at least at the highest level.  
56  Conversation with a European mentor at the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Kabul, October 2010.  
57  Interview with Major General Stuart Beare, NTM-A, Kabul, 6 October 2010. 
58  Conversation with a European mentor at the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Kabul, October 2010. 
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Afghan participation.59 By March 2011, the number of foreign advisers had grown to 282, 
appearing to outnumber the Afghan officials who were being mentored. Of these 282 
foreign advisers, 120 were contractors from DynCorp and MPRI, 119 were United States 
military and civilian officials, and 43 came from other countries.60 
The Pentagon demanded that its staff involved the international partners. In actual 
practice, however, this often merely meant that the Europeans were allowed to see power 
point presentations on decisions that had already been taken. Coordination problems 
became evident not least in the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), which 
had been set up in 2006.61 Initially the CSTC-A had agreed to contribute twelve US 
officials to the IPCB, which did not happen, however. Furthermore, Interior Minister 
Hanif Atmar (who had to resign in summer 2010) merely regarded the IPCB as a forum 
where donors coordinated their positions rather than made decisions,62 and disregarded it 
accordingly. A new coordination agency was established with the support of the USA in 
autumn 2010, the Ministry of Interior Coordination Cell – Police. The international 
partner here was the NTM-A. NATO not only provided the major share of funding but 
also the necessary infrastructure. Despite complex commando structures and frequently 
different positions on the part of the Member States, the military organization was better 
coordinated than civilian stakeholders. This now meant that the Minister of Interior 
Affairs only had to deal with a single partner.  
The dominance of the military was accompanied by a focus on measurable results. In 
2010, the NTM-A reduced basic police training from eight to six weeks.63 ANP officer 
training at the Kabul National Police Academy, the German showcase project – was 
reduced from three years to six months. According to a member of the German police 
team: “We were against it; but the fact is that more Afghan police are needed. We 
therefore gave in to the NTM-A and to the Americans.”64 In autumn 2010, the USA also 
changed the FDD concept: Due to the shortage of international military and police 
personnel, the intensive partnering phase that followed basic training was not to be 
performed systematically by partnering teams, but by rotating teams (Provincial Response 
Companies). This speeded up a programme which had been rather slow in the past: By 
March 2010, only 83 of a total of 365 police districts had completed FDD training (US 
Department of Defense 2010: 122). The risk with the shorter training period, however, 
was that the police would once again slip back into their old habits and take advantage of 
 
 
59  In order to improve coordination, the Canadian Embassy, with British support, called into being an 
Institutional Reform Working Group (IRWG). It was still not clear in early 2011 whether the IRWG will 
achieve its objectives. 
60  Saeed Shah, “Afghans rely heavily on foreign advisers as transition looms”, in: McClatchy Newspapers, 
March 8, 2011. 
61  This paragraph is based on conversations with members of EUPOL, NTM-A and the German Embassy, 
Kabul, October 2010.  
62  This applied rather at the highest level, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), than at 
working level.  
63  NATO emphasized that the number of training hours remained the same.  
64  Conversation, Kabul, October 2010.  
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the local population rather than protect them. One German police instructor claimed that 
the USA was training the Afghan police only to subsequently once again leave them to 
their own devices.65 Germany stuck to the original FDD concept because the Federal 
Government and the German police regarded FDD as pointless without intensive follow-
up measures.66  
The focus on quantity instead of quality was also acknowledged by NATO itself. A 
report by the NTM-A commander Lieutenant General William Caldwell, which was 
presented at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, states that even at the end 
of 2009 the large majority of the ANP “did not know the law they were responsible to 
enforce”. He added: “Not unexpectedly, most Afghans have come to view the ANP as 
lawless armed men, rather than trusted law enforcement officials.”67 Surveys confirm this 
negative image in part: 35 percent of the Afghans interviewed had a negative 
impression of the work of the local police (ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post 
2010).68 Focusing training on quantity thus hardly seems to be the right way to solve the 
continuing problems of the ANP. 
The shortage of instructors continues to be a huge problem. There is often a shortage 
of civilian police staff for training operations as well as for the partnering and mentoring 
operations of the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT) and Police 
Mentor Teams (PMT). Moreover, the civilian police staff were not capable of teaching 
many of the robust, military skills required. ISAF filled the gaps with soldiers so that the 
POMLT was comprised almost exclusively of soldiers.69 ISAF was forced to improvise as 
the soldiers, in turn, knew little about civilian police work and there was a shortage of police 
instructors. Accordingly, states dispatched their military police and soldiers with police 
experience (such as the US National Guard). Different national structures and practices 
meant that this stopgap solution served rather to thwart the introduction of uniform 
training standards.  
The greatest hopes for teaching the ANP robust skills were placed on the gendarmerie 
forces. Italian carabinieri, French gendarmes and similar forces from other states 
worked both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the European Gendarmerie 
Force, which was subordinate to the NTM-A in Afghanistan. The carabinieri at the 
Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul, the ANCOP’s main training centre, emphasized 
the advantages of their training methods compared to those of DynCorp, which they 
described as having a “civilian mentality”. The carabinieri taught the ANP to shoot whilst 
 
 
65  Conversation, Kabul, October 2010.  
66  Conversations with representatives of GPPT, Kabul and Mazar, October 2010.  
67 Quoted from Kim Sengupta, Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady, “Afghan police corruption hits NATO 
pullout”, in: The Independent, November 21, 2010. 
68  Similarly, The Asia Foundation 2010.  
69  The PMLTs of a Forward Operation Base in the province of Kandahar for example consisted exclusively 
of soldiers. Conversation with a Canadian officer at the Forward Operation Base, September 2009. More 
civilian police worked in the PMTs – for example in the German PMTs.  
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running and wearing a bullet-proof vest and helmet, to react when under fire from 
demonstrators, and to use machine guns and grenade launchers.70  
The close cooperation between the police and military had consequences not only at 
strategic but also at tactical and operational level. Official documents limited the role of 
the ANP. Accordingly, the police strategy of March 2010 distinguished between the duties 
of the various elements of the ANP. Whereas the ANCOP and other specialized ANP 
elements were intended to conduct high-risk operations, the AUP was to engage in crime 
prevention and detection work.71 This role was expressed in the renaming of the AUP to 
become the Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police (AUCP). In practice, however, the AUCP 
was still involved in offensive operations; that is to say, in the first phase of 
counterinsurgency (“clear”).72 For example, in summer 2010, US soldiers accompanied 
the regular AUP in embattled districts in the province of Kunduz.73 For many ISAF and 
ANA officers, the distinction between the various elements of the ANP was academic: 
they simply took those police that they were able to get.  
One considerable challenge remains that of evaluating progress in police-building. 
NATO’s mantra was that the basic police training programme made the ANP more 
capable of survival and more trustworthy. This point is debatable among other things 
because the Ministry of Interior Affairs sent many trained members of the district police 
to other regions in Afghanistan. Planning staff did not receive any information about 
their whereabouts and were therefore not able to say whether training had made the ANP 
more capable of survival and more trustworthy.74 EUPOL, for example, wanted to retrain 
350 Afghan police they had trained in 2009 so that these could secure polling stations for 
the September 2010 parliamentary elections. The Ministry of Interior Affairs, however, 
knew nothing about the whereabouts of these police because it had failed to introduce 
registration mechanisms for the ANP.75 The practice of self-assessment also made an 
evaluation more difficult. In summer 2010, one US supervisory body criticized the 
tendency of international planners and instructors to evaluate the abilities of Afghan units 
 
 
70  Own observation of police training at the CTC and the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), October 
2010. The image of DynCorp in Afghanistan did not therefore correspond to the military bias which is 
associated with security firms – soldiers and gendarmes criticized the civilian approach of DynCorp’s 
training programmes. There was also scepticism regarding the suitability of many employees of security 
firms for the tasks in Afghanistan and criticism regarding their lack of supervision.  
71  Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs (2010).  
72  One ISAF General spoke of the AUP as “light infantry”. Presentation, Kandahar Air Field, September 
2009. 
73  James Dao, “In Mission with Afghan Police, Issues of Trust”, New York Times, August 11, 2010. The 
target for ANP training in Regional Command North could not have been achieved without the 
deployment of an additional 5,000 US soldiers to RC North. Conversation with a Bundeswehr officer, 
Berlin, July 2010.  
74  Conversation with a member of the GPPT, Camp Marmal, Mazar, October 2010. 
75  Conversation with a European mentor at the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Kabul, October 2010. 
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in their care too optimistically: Many ANP units that received the highest marks were 
already in a state of disintegration only shortly after the international partners left.76  
Despite its brief duration, basic police training did improve the fighting strength of the 
ANP. However, the deployment of the ANP in high-risk districts thwarted this positive 
effect. At the beginning of 2010, the ANP was present in all 34 provinces in Afghanistan. 
The risk was considered medium-high in six of these provinces and very high in a further 
ten. A senior ANP officer had already said in 2008 “The ANP is being trained to go into 
war and to die.”77 1,500 members of the police were killed in 2009 (Bundesregierung 
2010). The numbers in 2010 were slightly lower, but there were still 1,292 fatalities.78  
5.5  Overlapping competencies 
The militarization of the regular ANP was just one component of a growing police-
military grey area. Since the NATO summit in Budapest in 2008, ISAF has been 
conducting operations against armed non-state actors in the grey areas of drug 
trafficking, insurgency and IED production.79 Furthermore, the police authorities and 
intelligence services of the donor states have increased their presence in Afghanistan over 
the years. As already mentioned, on the Afghan side there were various components 
within the ANP which were militarized. The ANA continued to take part in operations in 
all phases of the counterinsurgency programme, among other things also because there 
were not enough members of the police. The demarcation of tasks between the various 
elements of the ANP and between the ANA and ANP was still unclear even in autumn 
2010.80 
The auxiliary police were one of the most controversial phenomena of the Afghan 
security sector. Over the years, there were several initiatives to use militia-type police to 
enforce security at local level. The most important of these were the Afghan National 
Auxiliary Police, the Community Defense Initiative and the Afghan Public Protection 
Programme. General Petraeus strengthened the most comprehensive militia programme, 
the Afghan Local Police. This programme was inspired by the “Sons of Iraq” 
programme,81 under which the USA supported militias in Iraq. In Afghanistan, as in 
 
 
76  Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2010). 
77  Quoted from ICG (2008: 8). 
78  Xinhua, 1,292 Afghan police killed in 2010, www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-01/02/content_ 
11786771.htm (10.01.2011). 
79  Conversations with NATO officers, Kandahar, September 2009.  
80  Conversation with a British advisor to the Afghan Government, Kabul, 4 October 2010.  
81  Presentation by General Petraeus, ISAF HQ, Kabul, 9 October 2010. International stakeholders justified 
militia-type structures by referring to Afghan traditions such the Arbakai. However, this analogy fails to 
reflect the change in traditional tribal structures due to decades of war and the difficulty of steering local 
dynamics. Admittedly traditional mechanisms play an important role in solving conflicts at local level. 
Accordingly, many Afghans have more confidence in local shuras in investigating and punishing minor 
crimes or in conflicts involving property issues than in the police and judicial authorities (The Asia 
Foundation 2009: 85-97). Local shuras, however, like the traditional militias, are often under pressure 
 
28 Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel 
 
   
Iraq, US special units partnered these militias. Using quasi-private forces to strengthen 
state security forces involves considerable risks. The EU Special Envoy emphasized 
therefore: “We are not participating in this.”82 But this protest was too guarded to 
dissuade the USA from its plan. Germany therefore even had to come to terms with the 
presence of the Afghan Local Police in the area of Regional Command North, despite 
reports of offences by the militias against the local population.83  
5.6  Community-oriented police work 
The question of the legitimacy of the state is central to efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. 
The effectiveness and legitimacy of police work are two sides of the same coin (Bayley 
2005). Paradoxically, this is why the advocates of community-oriented police work are the 
better counterinsurgents because they can gain the trust of the local population which in 
turn is important for obtaining information. What is more, community-oriented police 
work is possible even in Afghanistan and even in areas of Afghanistan where war prevails. 
Whereas international stakeholders tended primarily to want to quickly increase the 
size of the ANP, there were also programmes which aimed for community orientation. 
For example, approximately 400 members of the police were trained in the principles of 
community policing under the German Rule of Law Programme in 2009 and 2010, and 
information campaigns and roundtables were organized (Bundesregierung 2010: 29). In 
some districts, NGOs also taught the ANP about human rights and violence against 
women. However, these projects were only short-term as most of them did not have long-
term funding, were based on personal contacts and were not part of an overall strategy.84 
Accordingly, neither the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs nor the international 
institutions kept a list of all projects. 
In late 2010, officers of the NTM-A therefore tried to collect information about 
community-oriented police projects and to support such projects – many people within 
the NTM-A were certainly aware of the limits of military programmes. The NTM-A 
wanted to improve communication between the police and the local councils. For 
example, citizens would be able to demand from the police that they drove more slowly in 
the vicinity of schools, and the police would inform school students about the danger of 
improvised bombs.85 
 
from insurgent and criminal groups. They cannot therefore systematically replace the civilian police, 
particularly not in cases involving serious crimes. International stakeholders and Afghan ministries have 
made too little effort to separate the competencies of traditional institutions from those of official 
institutions and to codify these in law.  
82  Interview with Ambassador Vygaudas Ušackas, Kabul, 9 October 2010.  
83  Cf. for example Ahmadi (2010).  
84  Conversation with an officer from the NTM-A, Kabul, 11 October 2010.  
85  Conversation with an officer from the NTM-A, Kabul, 11 October 2010. 
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In these efforts, the officers found a partner in the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), which was able to refer to successful projects of its own.86 The 
UNDP police projects focused on districts which were relatively secure due to the 
disarmament of illegal armed groups and the presence of sub-national government 
structures. But the UNDP also encouraged a close exchange between the ANP and the 
local population even in districts in relatively insecure provinces such as Nangahar. This 
exchange not only strengthened state legitimacy; it also produced direct advantages with 
regard to security because the ANP obtained more information about suspicious persons 
and finds of IEDs. Many steps towards confidence-building are simple; such as making 
the entrance areas of police stations more attractive. Community-oriented police work 
creates trust. Militarization and the ensuing isolation of the police from the public, on the 
other hand, are problematic.  
6.  Conclusions 
Ideal-typically, the reform of the security sector in post-conflict states is linear. First of all, 
the military takes over police duties, particularly if the security situation is poor. The 
transition to a civilian police model then follows in the course of time. This report 
outlines the conditions which prevented the implementation of this model in 
Afghanistan. International donors failed to help to establish public order and rule of law 
in the decisive initial years and to coordinate their approaches. The lack of commitment 
to building a civilian police force served not least to strengthen the dominance of the 
Pentagon. On the Afghan side, the escalation of the armed conflict, poor government 
leadership, the absence of a tradition of civilian police work and the desolate state of the 
police encouraged the military bias of police reform.  
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the handover of responsibility for 
security to the Afghan government by 2014 significantly limits the donors’ scope for 
action. They will now focus even more on short-term stability instead of on human 
security and the fight against crime.87 Furthermore, the weaknesses of earlier strategy 
decisions to create a strong central state and establish President Karzai as a central ruler are 
becoming increasingly obvious. Thus, the Karzai government has little interest in effective 
criminal prosecution work.88 
It is therefore rather unlikely that there will be a transition from a military to a civilian 
police model once the security situation has improved. After all, examples in other 
countries show that it is difficult to reverse the militarization of the police (Herzog 2001). 
The question lingers of whether the police should remain a civilian force or should 
 
 
86  Interview with a member of UNDP, Kabul, 9 October 2010.  
87  The West is partly dependent on the warlords, for example for securing NATO transport routes.  
88  According to reports, Karzai wanted to reduce the powers of the law enforcement authorities which 
investigate the crimes of politicians and businessmen. Cf. Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghanistan Money 
Probe Hits Close to the President”, Wall Street Journal, 12 August 2010. 
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combat the insurgency as quickly as possible and provide cover for the announced 
withdrawal of the foreign forces. A clear answer appears to be emerging following the 
change of course in 2009. The international community is investing huge funds in getting 
more “boots on the ground” to establish the conditions for withdrawal. The police are 
part of counterinsurgency efforts and are being trained for this task.  
Admittedly, military elements are necessary to support the ANP. The police would not 
be able to defend themselves against well armed and well organized insurgent and 
criminal groups without military equipment and basic military skills. Nevertheless, the 
police must be as civilian-oriented as possible and as military-oriented as necessary – with 
regard to their equipment, presence, structure and duties. The long-term protection of the 
civilian population – a central element of counterinsurgency – demands a balance 
between the military and civilian elements of police-building.  
It is now a matter of correcting the imbalance and strengthening the civilian approach 
to police reform. It would be difficult to argue that the militarization of the police has 
made Afghanistan more secure – in 2010, Afghanistan was less secure than ever since the 
end of the Taliban’s reign. Furthermore, there is also the danger of creating problems for 
the future. A heavily armed Afghanistan, where warlords control local police units or 
auxiliary police, and a militarized police force which does not enjoy the confidence of the 
public are ingredients for an explosive situation for many years to come.  
It is still not too late to rectify the imbalance between the civilian and military 
elements in building the ANP. It is particularly important to support the ANP in the long 
term. Institutional reforms need time. Even the reforms in the Balkans have only been 
modestly successful, despite the relatively straightforward situation in the region and the 
massive international support provided. Establishing sustainable police reform in 
Afghanistan is a task which will take generations. External stakeholders will probably still 
be in Afghanistan after the end of combat operations at the beginning of 2015. It is 
important to already start to rethink the programming of projects. Sustainable police 
reform usually requires more than the customary two to three-year programme cycles of 
international cooperation, among other things because of the lack of planning certainty 
for local stakeholders. One can hardly expect the Afghan police to defend the new order if 
they cannot be certain that they will receive long-term support.  
Furthermore, it should be civilian police experts and not soldiers who dominate the 
strategic approach of police reform. In particular, measures should be taken to strengthen 
the civilian police responsibilities of the AUCP, which unlike the specialized ANP 
elements should not serve as a force multiplier for counterinsurgency. Foreign donors, in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere, should not create the impression that the regular police are 
going to war (Bayley/ Perito 2010: 95). A more civilian approach to police reform, on the 
other hand, means that the problems caused by the lack of instructors, partners and 
mentors must be tackled as soon as possible. This, in turn, demands more career 
incentives to sign up for missions abroad.  
The reorientation of the current strategy should begin by taking stock of all police 
programmes. Also important are independent evaluations of what has already been 
achieved and of the remaining problems. Success should not be defined on the basis of 
measurable output indicators such as the number of police training days alone. More 
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decisive factors are the confidence of the civilian population and improvements in the 
security situation.  
Many further steps are necessary to improve police work in Afghanistan. The reform 
of the Ministry of Interior Affairs calls for modern management methods to improve the 
efficiency of the Ministry’s work. By the same token, areas of responsibility should be 
clearly defined between the police and other security players and between the police and 
the Ministry of Interior Affairs. A clear legal framework and its corresponding 
implementation are essential. Effective police work depends not only on the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs but also on an efficient justice sector.89 International donors have 
neglected the judiciary and the penal system for all too long.  
These reforms are not only of a technical nature but are also political processes. They 
require measures to strengthen pro-reform forces within Afghanistan – both inside and 
outside the government – if they are to be sustainable and self-supporting. Cooperation 
with warlords and other stakeholders whose power is derived from the barrel of a gun can 
only produce security in the short term, if at all. What is important is democratic control 
of the ANP and a strong civil society.  
The difficult balancing act between (military) self-protection and openness towards 
the public requires regional adjustments. It would be problematic to withdraw the regular 
police from all the high-risk provinces. But even there, the AUCP can be stationed in the 
safest districts. The question of how to enforce the distinction between self-protection 
and a community-oriented police force should depend on the local security situation and 
local societal structures. Instructors can improvise; for example, by training police from a 
high-risk district in a safer neighbouring district. Elements of military training are 
necessary for self-protection purposes and for tasks such as setting up checkpoints or 
identifying IEDs. This military training must, however, be accompanied by training in 
community-oriented police work and literacy campaigns.  
All this does not call for a new police strategy but for a gradual reorientation of ANP 
reform that takes into account the needs of the Afghan people. Militarization increases 
the risk of a renewed need for intervention at a later date. Moreover: It is a question of the 
security of 30 million people in Afghanistan; people to whom Western governments have 
made huge promises.  
 
 
 
89  Cf. Krempel (2010) for the build-up of the Afghan judicial system.  
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Acronyms 
AA    Federal Foreign Office 
ANA    Afghan National Army 
ANCOP   Afghan National Civil Order Police 
ANP    Afghan National Police 
AUCP    Afghan Uniformed Civilian Police 
AUP   Afghan Uniformed Police 
BMI    Federal Ministry of the Interior 
BMVg    Federal Ministry of Defence 
BMZ  Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development  
BRD    Federal Republic of Germany 
BT    Federal Parliament 
CID    Criminal Investigation Department 
COIN    Counterinsurgency  
CSTC-A   Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan 
CTC    Central Training Center 
DDR    German Democratic Republic 
EUPOL   European Union Police Mission  
FDD    Focused District Development 
GAO    Government Accountability Office 
GPPT    German Police Project Team 
GTZ    German Technical Cooperation  
IED    Improvised Explosive Device 
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
IPCB    International Police Coordination Board 
IRWG   Institutional Reform Working Group 
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force 
KMTC    Kabul Military Training Center 
MDB    Ministerial Development Board  
MICC-P   Ministry of the Interior Coordination Cell - Police  
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NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDS    National Directorate of Security 
NGO    Non-governmental Organization 
NTM-A   NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan 
OECD    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEF    Operation Enduring Freedom 
OSCE   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PMT    Police Mentoring Team 
POMLT   Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team 
PRT    Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PTC    Police Training Center 
SSR    Security Sector Reform 
UNDP    United Nations Development Programme  
UNODC   United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
USA   United States of America 
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